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Abstract
Generalized Vickrey mechanisms have received wide atten-
tion in the literature because they are efﬁcient and strategy-
proof, i.e. truthful bidding is optimal whatever the bids of
other agents. However it is well-known that it is impossible
for an exchange, with multiple buyers and sellers, to be efﬁ-
cient and budget-balanced, even putting strategy-proofness to
one side. A market-maker in anefﬁcient exchange mustmake
morepayments thanitcollects. Weenforcebudget-balanceas
a hard constraint, and explore payment rules to distribute sur-
plus after an exchange clears to minimize distance to Vickrey
payments. Different rules lead to different levels of truth-
revelation and efﬁciency. Experimental and theoretical anal-
ysis suggest a simple Threshold scheme, which gives surplus
to agents with payments further than a certain threshold value
from their Vickrey payments. The scheme appears able to ex-
ploit agent uncertainty about bids from other agents to reduce
manipulation and boost allocative efﬁciency in comparison
with other simple rules.
Introduction
The participants in an exchange, or agents, can submit both
bids, i.e. requests to buy items for no more than a bid price,
and asks, i.e. requests to sell items for at least an ask price.
Exchanges allow multiple buyers to trade with multiple sell-
ers, with aggregation across bids and asks as necessary to
clear the market. An exchange might also allow agents to
express logical conditions across bundles of different items;
for example, an agent might want to buy “
￿
and
￿ ”, or
sell “
￿
and
￿ , or
￿ ”. Following the literature on combi-
natorial auctions (Rothkopf et al. 1998; de Vries & Vohra
2000) we call this a combinatorial exchange. Applications
of combinatorial exchanges have been suggested to excess
steel inventory procurement (Kalagnanam et al. 2000) and
to supply chain coordination (Walsh et al. 2000).
The market maker in an exchange collects bids and asks
and clears the exchange by computing: (i) a set of trades,
and (ii) the payments made and received by agents. In
designing a mechanism to compute trades and payments
we must consider the bidding strategies of self-interested
agents, i.e. rational agents that follow expected-utility max-
imizing strategies. We take as our primary goal that of
allocative-efﬁciency: to compute a set of trades that maxi-
mize value. In addition, we require:
Copyright c
￿
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–individual-rationality(IR), or voluntary participation, such
that all agents have positive expected utility to participate.
– budget-balance (BB), such that the exchange does not run
at a loss.
Another useful property is incentive-compatibility (IC),
which states that truthful bidding (submitting bid and ask
prices equal to an agent’s value) forms a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium. In other words, every agent can maximize
its expected utility by bidding its true values, given that
every other agent also bids truthfully. A stronger condi-
tion is strategy-proofness, such that truthful bidding is op-
timal whatever the bids of other agents. Strategy-proofness
is useful computationally because agents can avoid game-
theoretic reasoning about other agents.
Unfortunately, the well-known result of Myerson & Sat-
terthwaite (1983) demonstrates that no exchange can be
efﬁcient, budget-balanced (even in the average-case), and
individual-rational. This impossibility result holds with
or without incentive-compatibility1, and even in Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium. Instead, one must:
(a) impose BB and IR, and design a fairly efﬁcient but
incentive-compatible (or perhaps strategy-proof) scheme.
(b) impose BB and IR, and design a fairly efﬁcientand fairly
incentive-compatible scheme.
We follow (b), and design a mechanism for combinatorial
exchanges (with multi-unit and regular exchanges as spe-
cialcases)thatpromotesreasonabletruth-revelationandrea-
sonable allocative-efﬁciency. The mechanism computes the
value-maximizingallocationgivenagentbids, and computes
payments to reduce the utility for non-truthful bidding.
Earlier authors (Myerson & Satterthwaite 1983; McAfee
1992; Barbera & Jackson 1995) have followed approach (a),
deliberately computing allocations that are inefﬁcient for
truthful bids from agents to achieve incentive-compatibility
or strategy-proofness. We do not believe their schemes ex-
tend easily to combinatorial problems. Furthermore, we be-
lieve that our scheme is particularly useful with bounded-
rational agents with incomplete information about other
agents, because such agents are unable to fully exploit the
“holes” for manipulation that remain in our designs.
A Vickrey-Based Payment Scheme
Our particular approach takes the Vickrey payment scheme,
and adapts it to make it budget-balanced. Without the prob-
1As it must, by the revelation principle.lem of BB, Vickrey payments support an efﬁcient, IR, and
strate
￿ gy-proof exchange.
We interpret Vickrey payments as an assignment of dis-
counts to agents after the exchangeclears. BB is achieved so
long as the market maker distributes no more than the avail-
able surplus when the exchange clears. The pricing problem
is formulated as an optimization problem, to compute dis-
counts to minimize the distance to Vickrey discounts. We
derive the payment schemes that correspond to optimal so-
lutions to a number of different distance functions.
Theoretical and experimental analysis compares the util-
ity to an agent for misstating its value in bids and asks in
each payment scheme across a suite of problem instances.
The results, both theoretical and experimental, make quite
a compelling argument for a simple threshold payment
scheme which provides discounts to agents with payments
more than a threshold distance than their Vickrey payments.
The Threshold rule increases the amount by which an
agent with a large degree of manipulation freedom must
adjust its bid to have a useful effect on the price it ﬁnally
pays, while leaving unaffected the manipulation properties
for agents with a small degree of manipulation freedom.
The effect is to reduce manipulation and boost allocative-
efﬁciency in comparison with other schemes.
Let us introduce an example problem, that we will return
to later in the paper.
Example. Suppose agents 1, 2, 3, 4. Agents 1 and 2 want
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. The efﬁ-
cient allocation is for agents 1 and 2 to trade with agent 3,
for a net increase in value of $36.
The mechanism design problem is: given bid and ask
prices for
￿
,
￿ and
￿
￿ from the agents, what trades should
take place and what payments should be made and received?
Vickrey Based Surplus Distribution
Themarketmakerinanexchangehastwoproblems tosolve:
winner determination, to determine the trades executed, and
pricing, to determine agent payments. A common goal in
winner-determination is to compute trades that maximize
surplus, the difference between bid prices and ask prices.2
These trades implement the efﬁcient allocation with truthful
bids and asks.
The pricing problemis to determineagent payments when
the exchange clears. In this section we describe an ap-
plication of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves pricing mechanism
(Vickrey 1961; Clarke 1971; Groves 1973) to an exchange,
which often fails BB. The presentation is for a combinato-
rial exchange, in which agents can bid and ask for bundles
of items and express logical constraints, e.g. “exclusive-or”
and “additive-or” constraints, across bids and asks.3
2The payment schemes presented in this paper are also applica-
ble with any (ex ante ﬁxed) constraint on feasible trades; e.g. any
level of aggregation in matching trades, or side constraints, e.g. on
the volume of trade or degree of dominance by a single agent.
3Vickrey payments in exchanges for homogeneous items, with
and without multi-unit bids can be derived as special cases (Wur-
Computing payments in a Vickrey-based exchange also
requires solving a number of winner-determination prob-
lems, once without each agent that trades. Winner-
determination is NP-hard for general combinatorial ex-
change problems and intractable as problems become large.
However, our current focus is on the incentive proper-
ties of novel Vickrey-based payment schemes. Tractable
winner-determinationis notourpresentconcern. Thisnoted,
the payment schemes proposed are immediately applicable
to tractable special cases of combinatorial exchanges (see
Kalagnanam et al.) Future work should explore the ef-
fect of layering our schemes on top of approximate winner-
determination algorithms.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the Vickrey payments in an exchange, and
thenarguethatthefailureofBBisquitepervasivewithVick-
rey payments in exchanges.
Vickrey Payments
Let
# denote the set of agents and
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Bids and asks deﬁne a reported value,
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for buying a bundle of items, while asks indicate negative
value for selling a bundle of items. For example, if agent
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, and no additional value for buying more than
bundle
￿
￿ .
Let
D
W
V denote the value-maximizingtrade, givenreported
values,
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X
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￿
, from each agent, with total surplus
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￿
. Trades must be feasible, so that supply and
demand is balanced, given a model of aggregation. Also,
let
￿
[
Y
]
\
/
￿
V denote surplus from the value-maximizing trade
without bids (or asks) from agent
: .
By deﬁnition, the Vickreypayment to agent
: is computed
as:
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indicate that the agent receives money from the exchange
after it clears.
We can express an agent’s Vickreypayment as a discount,
f
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where the Vickrey discount is computed as:
f
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The Vickrey discount is always non-negative, representing
smaller payments by buyers and higher payments to sellers.
man et al. 1998).
2Economic Properties. Vickrey payments are IR, because
Y
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V
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￿
V by a simple feasibility argument, and also
strategy-proof. The proof of strategy-proofness is omitted
due to lack of space, but closely follows standard Vickrey
proofs, for example see Varian & MacKie-Mason (1995).
However, BB will often fail in an exchange, as we show in
the next section.
Vickrey Budget-Balance: Success & Failure
Now that we have deﬁned Vickrey payments in a combina-
torial exchange, let us outline some cases in which BB is
achieved and some cases in which BB fails. We will see
that budget-balance failure is quite pervasive with Vickrey
payments in exchanges.
Standard Exchange. First, consider a standard exchange
with bids and asks for single units of a homogeneous item.
In this case the exchange is cleared by sorting bids in order
of decreasing price and asks in order of increasing price.
Bids are matched with asks while the bid price is greater
than the ask price. It is well known that Vickrey payments
are not BB in this environment.
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^
‘
l
r
J
s
[
t de-
note the largest successful ask and
^
\
F
￿
r
J
s
[
t denote the small-
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whatever its own ask price, and every winning buyer pays
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The following condition is required for BB:
Claim 1. Budget-balance is achieved in a simple exchange
for homogeneous items and single-item bids and asks if and
only if one (or more) of the following conditions hold: (1)
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Proof sketch. BB holds if and only if
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In other words, either one or more of the supply or de-
mand curves must be “smooth” at the clearing point, with
the ﬁrst excluded bid at approximately the same bid price as
the last accepted bid, or the winning bid and ask prices must
precisely coincide. Thus, we cannot expect BBwith Vickrey
payments even in a standard (non-combinatorial) exchange
except in special cases.
Combinatorial Exchange As an example of BB failure,
consider that agents submit truthful bids in the earlier exam-
ple; i.e. asks (
￿
, $10), (
￿ , $5) and bids (
￿
￿ , $51), (
￿
￿ ,
$40).
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. Agent 1’s Vickrey pay-
ment is -10 - (36 - 0) = -46, agent 2’s is -5 - (36 - 0) = -41,
agent 3’s is 51 - (36 - 25) = 40. The exchange runs at a loss
of $47 to the market maker.
One-Sided Vickrey-Payments First, a positive special-
case. Claim 2 gives a sufﬁcient condition for BB in the
special-case that Vickrey discounts are only allocated to
agents on one-side of an exchange, i.e. to all buyers or to
all sellers (but not to buyers and sellers).
We deﬁne aggregation on the sell-side as when bids from
multiple buyers can be combined to match an ask from a
single seller, and aggregation on the buy-side as when asks
from multiple sellers can be combined to match a bid from
a single buyer.
Claim 2. Budget-balance holds if Vickrey payments are im-
plemented on one-side of an exchange, and when that side
has no aggregation.
Proof sketch. Simple, just show that this BB holds for
each “cluster” of trading agents, and therefore for the entire
exchange.
Bilateral matching is a special-case, with no aggregation
on either side; i.e. Vickrey payments are budget-balanced
if implemented for at most one agent in each trade, for
example with trades cleared at either the ask price (buy-
side strategy-proofness) or the bid price (sell-side strategy-
proofness). Similarly, the single-item Vickrey auction is a
special case (and strategy-proof to buyers but not the seller).
The Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) is the VCG
mechanism for a combinatorial auction, in which there is
a single seller and sell-side aggregation. The GVA is BB
because the buyers, but not the seller, receive Vickrey pay-
ments. The auctioneer simply collects the total payment
made by the buyers and passes it on to the seller. As such the
GVA is strategy-proof for buyers but not for the seller. An-
other problem is that the seller can sometimes receive less
than her ask price. Consider a seller with an ask price of
(
￿
￿ , $10) and bids of (
￿
, $8) and (
￿ , $8) from different
buyers. Each buyer receives Vickrey discount $6 and pays
$2, but the seller needs at least $10.
One-to-N models We can state a general negative result
for Vickrey payments to all agents (buyers and sellers) in a
combinatorial auction.
Claim 3. Budget-balance fails with Vickrey payments to all
agents in a combinatorial auction except in the case that no
buyer requires a Vickrey discount.
Proof sketch. Simple, just show that the seller extracts
all of the surplus as its Vickrey discount.
Intuitively, BB fails in this case unless the marginal value
contributed by each buyer is zero, i.e. unless the surplus
in the exchange is the same with any one of the buyers re-
moved.
Budget-Balanced Payment Rules
In this section we take BB and IR as hard constraints and
propose methods to distribute surplus when an exchange
clears to minimize the distance between discounts and Vick-
rey discounts. The choice of distance function has a distri-
butional effect on the allocation of surplus and changes the
incentive-compatibilityproperties of the exchange. In alater
section we demonstrate useful truth-revelationproperties for
the Vickrey-based schemes.
We do the following:
3￿ Formulate the pricing problem as a mathematical pro-
gram,
￿ to minimize the distance to Vickrey payments with
BB and IR as hard constraints.
￿ Introduce possible distance functions and construct corre-
sponding budget-balanced payment schemes.
￿ Present a theoretical analysis of each payment scheme in
a simple bidding model.
Mathematical Programming Model
We formulate the pricing problem as a linear program, to as-
sign surplus to agents to minimize distance to Vickrey dis-
counts. Let
Y
V denote the available surplus when the ex-
change clears, before any discounts, and
￿
￿
V
￿
￿
￿
# denote the
set of agents that trade. Each agent may perform a number
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Constraint (BB) gives worst-case (or ex post) budget-
balance, such that the exchange never makes a net payment
to agents. We might also substitute an expected surplus
Y
V for
Y
￿
V and implement average-case (or ex ante) budget-
balance. Constraints (IR) ensure that truthful bids and asks
are individual-rational for an agent, with a worst-case (or ex
post) non-negativeexpected utility. Constraints (VD) ensure
that no agent receives more than its Vickrey discount.4
In addition to the standard L
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distributional information.
We drop agents with
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from all models, and
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for these agents.
Payment Rules Rather than solving problem [PP] di-
rectly, we can compute an analytic expression for the family
of solutions that correspond to each distance function. Each
family of solutions is a parameterized payment rule. For ex-
ample, the Threshold rule,
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￿
, solves [PP] for the L
￿ distance met-
ric. For large
￿ , Threshold allocates small, or no, discounts,
while for
￿
￿
j
￿
Threshold allocates Vickrey discounts.
To understand theconstructionof ThresholdfromL
￿ con-
sider the simplest case, when constraints (VD) and (IR) are
4The (VD) constraints are not redundant for certain distance
metrics, such as the L
·
￿
￿
0
¶
q
•
‚ metric.
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Table 1: Distance Functions and Payment Schemes.
Rule Vick Equal Frac Thresh Reverse Large Small
Agent 1 -46 -22 -25.6 -28 -22.5 -46 or -10 -35 or -10
Agent 2 -41 -17 -20.6 -23 -17.5 -5 -41 -5 -30
Agent 3 40 39 46.2 51 40 51 51 40 40
Table 2: Payments with Different Rules in the Simple Problem.
not binding, and perform Lagrangian optimization. Drop-
ping the outer square root from the L
￿ metric and introduc-
ing Lagrange multiplier
￿
￿
i
￿
, we have
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. Now, computing ﬁrst deriva-
tives w.r.t.
f
/
and setting to zero, we have
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for all
: .5 Solving, this equates the dis-
tance to Vickrey discounts across all agents,
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Table1tabulatesthepaymentrulesforeachdistancefunc-
tion, and also includes the Equal rule which is not Vickrey-
based but divides surplus equally across all agents, and the
No-Discount rule (see also Figure 1). Each payment rule is
parameterized with
￿
h
i
￿
, except for Fractional, which has
parameter
￿
￿
￿
￿
=
￿
￿
. The parameters that give BB in each
scheme can be easily computed from Vickrey discounts and
available surplus.
Example. In Table 2 we compare the payments made with
each payment scheme in our simple problem. Notice that
neither the Large or Small schemes provide useful guidance
about how to distribute the discount across the two sellers,
this depends on how the tie is broken.
Theoretical Analysis
In this section we develop simple analytic results for the
amount of manipulation an agent will perform with each
payment scheme. The model permits tractable analysis, and
proves interesting both for the insight it provides and for the
close correspondence that we ﬁnd with later experimental
results for combinatorial exchange problems.
We choose to analyze an exchange in which bids and asks
are for single items. Later, in our experimental analysis we
compare the payment schemes in combinatorial problems.
For buyers (the analysis is symmetric for sellers):
(1) Every agent
: has value
￿
/
for a single item (drawn
from some distribution
￿
/
￿
O
￿
￿
) and chooses to manipulate by
5First-order conditions are necessary and sufﬁcient for optimal-
ity in this problem because the Hessian is positive deﬁnite.
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Figure 1: Bid price
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˘ (x-axis) against adjusted bid price
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˘
(y-axis) in each payment scheme. Agent value
￿ , highest outside
bid
ª , Payment scheme parameters
¨ ,
￿ ,
￿ .
￿
/
i
￿
, and bid
￿
/
￿
￿
/
3
￿
/
.
(2) The maximum bid
;
/
from another agent for the item,
or ask price (whichever is higher), is uniformly distributed
about
￿
/
, i.e.
;
/
*
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
/
3
(
Ł
￿
’
￿
/
￿
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￿
￿
for some constant,
Ł
￿
￿
.
(3) The average surplus available to the market maker when
theexchangeclearsis
Ø
Ł
per-agent,forsomeconstant
Ø
￿
￿
that deﬁnes the amount of surplus.
(4) In equilibrium, the market maker selects a parameter
(e.g.
￿ ) for the payment scheme to achieve average-case
budget-balance. Payment rules are computed before agents
bid, and the parameters are known to bidding agents.
Agent
: has a quasi-linear utility function,
Œ
/
￿
￿
/
3
^
, for
submitting the highest bid where
^
is its payment to the ex-
change, i.e.
^
￿
￿
/
3
￿
f
/
. Figure 1 illustrates each payment
rule in this simple model, plotting bid price
￿
/
against ad-
justed price
￿
/
3
￿
f
/
; e.g., in Vickrey the agent pays only
;
for any bid
￿
/
i
;
, in Threshold the agent pays
￿
/
￿
º
;
￿
￿
for
￿
/
i
;
￿
￿ , and
￿
/
for
;
￿
￿
/
e
;
￿
￿ , given parameter
￿ , etc.
For each payment scheme we determine: (a) an agent’s
optimal bidding strategy as a function of the parameters of
the rule, e.g.
￿ or
￿
; and (b) the equilibrium parameteriza-
tion of therule, e.g. value for
￿ , that leadstobudget-balance
given that agents follow this optimal bidding strategy. The
analysis leads to a relationship between the available sur-
plus and the degree of manipulation for each payment rule
(see Figure 4).
One can be critical of our assumptions. We leave un-
deﬁned both the valuation distribution functions
￿
/
￿
O
￿
￿
and
the distribution that deﬁnes the item an individual agent
values. It is quite likely that there are no
￿
/
￿
O
￿
￿
that are
consistent with our assumption of a uniformly distributed
second-highest bid in equilibrium. In addition, we adopt
average-casebudget-balanceandcomputepaymentrulesbe-
fore agents bid, but ignore any effect that rules have on sur-
plus via agents’ bidding strategies.
However, we believe that this analysis has signiﬁcant
value. Its main success is that it clearly demonstrates the
effect that different types of budget-balanced Vickrey-based
payment rules can have on agent manipulation. We leave a
full equilibrium analysis for future work.
Graphical Intuition. Manipulation has two effects on the
expected utility for an agent: (i) the probability of the ad-
justed bid being accepted decreases, and (ii) the total utility
if the bid is accepted can go up because the agent’s payment
might be reduced. Payment rules change (ii) but not (i), and
in turn effectagents’ bidsand the efﬁciencyof the exchange.
In Figure 2 we plot the utility for a particular bid,
￿
￿
￿
3
￿
, as the value of the outside bid
;
varies, for payment
schemes Vickrey, No-Discount, Threshold and Fractional.
Each subplot is for a single scheme, with individual curves
corresponding to different bids.6
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Figure 2: Utility of bids
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In the Vickrey scheme a lower bid reduces the agent’s ex-
pected utility because it decreases the probability of success
without increasing the utility of a successful bid. In compar-
ison, with no discount the agent gains utility on all success-
ful bids by the amount of deviation from truthful bidding.
In the Threshold scheme a lower bid only reduces the price
paid for a limited range of outside bids (closer than
￿ to the
bid price), while in the Fractional scheme a lower bid re-
duces the price paid on all successful bids (but by less than
in the No Discount scheme).
Making our assumption about the distribution of
;
around
an agent’s value
￿
/
, we can compute the expected utility for
different levels of manipulation under each scheme as the
area under a particular curve in a plot like Figure 2.7 The
expected-utility maximizing bid corresponds to the curve
withmaximumarea. InFigure3weplottheexpectedgainin
utility(in comparison withtruthful bidding),
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at optimal agent strate-
6Although not plotted here, the curves for Equal are similar to
the No-Discount case (except shifted higher in utility by a constant
amount), and Large is similar to Threshold.
7It is at this stage that an equilibrium analysis would need to
use a derived expression for the distribution of
ª .
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Figure 3: Expected Gain in Utility for different bids
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gies. Notice that the level of manipulation,
￿
V , that maxi-
mizes the agent’s gain in utility is smallest in the Threshold
scheme for this value of surplus.
The results (below) show that the Large and Threshold
rules perform well in this model, and lead to the following
intuitive remarks about payment rules (see Figure 1):
1. A large ﬂat section for bids close to the agent’s true value
is useful, i.e. with adjusted bid price independent of the
agent’s bid price.
2. Nowhere should the adjusted bid price be greater than the
agent’s bid price (for IR with truthful bidding), which con-
strains the line to lie to the right of the “no-discount” line.
3. It is more important to implement the ﬂat section for val-
ues,
￿ , far from the highest outside bid,
;
, than values close
to the highest outside bid (i.e. Large rather than Small),
because manipulation is already more risky for true values
close to
￿ than far from
;
.8
It is useful to think about the “degree of manipulation
freedom” available to an agent, which in this simple single-
bundle model is the difference between an agent’s value
￿
and the highest outside bid
;
. In general, this is simply mea-
sured by the Vickrey discount to an agent that bids truth-
fully, i.e. the amount by which it could have reduced its bid
price and still participated in the same trades. The Large and
Threshold schemes are effectivebecause theymake manipu-
lation more difﬁcult and less useful for an agent with a large
degree of manipulation freedom, while leaving the ability to
manipulate of agents with a small degree of manipulation
freedom unchanged. This is a good incentive strategy be-
cause it attacks the “low risk” manipulation opportunities,
but leaves the “high risk” opportunities. Agents are uncer-
tain about the bids from other agents and always run the risk
of bidding too low and forfeiting a proﬁtable trade.
Results. Table 3 summarizes the analytical results, giving
an agent’s optimal bidding strategy,
￿
V , as a function of the
parameter in each scheme, and the expected discount per-
8Note that in terms of efﬁciency the picture is mixed. While we
can stand more manipulation from agents with large values com-
pared to
ª , without changing the trades that we implement, if the
bids from those agents does change the ﬁnal implementation the
effect on efﬁciency is likely to be quite large.
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Table 3: Analytical results.
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Figure 4: Optimal agent manipulation,
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agent given that optimal strategy.9 We present an example
derivation, for the Threshold rule, below.
In Figure 4 we enforce BB, computing parameters in the
payment schemes to set the expected discount equal to sur-
plus
Ø
Ł
, and plot the equilibrium manipulation performed in
each payment scheme as the amount of surplus varies. The
Vickrey payment scheme can be implemented with surplus
Ł
￿
￿
!
 
per-agent, soall schemes except Equaland No-Discount
prevent manipulation completely for
Ø
i
￿
‘
)
￿
￿
￿
. For smaller
amounts of surplus the market maker is forced to deviate
from Vickrey, and move left in Figure 4. At
Ø
￿
￿
no
schemes can provide any discount, and the agent manipu-
lates by
Ł
￿
￿
￿
￿
.
First, notice that the simple minded Equal scheme ap-
pears to have bad incentiveproperties. In fact, the Threshold
method dominates all other schemes in this model except
Large. Large has an interesting bad-good phase transition
at
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(
, and can prevent manipulation completely for
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even though agents with small Vickrey dis-
counts might have beneﬁted from manipulation with hind-
sight. Agent uncertaintycoupled with therisk of bidding too
low and either falling from the ﬂat section or under-bidding
the highest outside bid lead agents to bid truthfully.
9It is useful to conﬁrm that all expressions reduce to that for the
Vickrey and No-Discount rules at extreme parameter values (e.g.
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to minimize manipulation.
Experimental Analysis
In this section we provide an experimental analysis of the
payment schemes in a set of combinatorial problem in-
stances. Agents are either buyers or sellers, and values
are assigned to agents for bundles following the Random,
Weighted Random, Decay, and Uniform distributions from
Sandholm (1999), adapted in this case to a combinatorial
exchange. Each agent submits bids (asks) for multiple bun-
dles, with exclusive-or constraints across bids (asks). We
test problems with 5, 10, and 20 agents, a total of 100 bids
and asks (evenly distributed across agents), 50 goods, and
with different proportions of buyers and sellers.10
10Results are averaged over 80 problem instances, for numbers
of Buyer/Sellers
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Figure 5: Average Single-Agent Gain in Utility from manipula-
tion by
N % (vs. truthful bidding), in a system in which every other
agent manipulates by
N %. Problem size: 5 buyers/5 sellers.
In our theoretical model we adopted average-case budget-
balance to make the analysis tractable. We now revert to
the more natural worst-case (or every-time) budget-balance
in which the market maker distributes exactly the available
surplus every time the exchange is cleared. Payment rules
are now computed after bids are received.
We perform a limited strategic analysis. First, we assume
that the strategy of agent
: is to adjust all its bids and asks by
the same fractional amount,
O
/
%, i.e. submitting bid prices
O
/
% below value and ask prices
O
/
% above value. Second,
we look for a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which every
agent follows the same strategy, for some
O %. Finally, we
compute an approximation to this equilibrium for computa-
tional tractability. We compute the average utility gain to a
single agent for 0% vs.
O % manipulation, given that every
other agent manipulates by
O %, and determine the amount
of manipulation,
O
‘
V , that maximizes this utility gain. We as-
sume that this is also the optimal strategy for an individual
agent against a population of agents with ﬁxed strategies
O
‘
V ,
and therefore the Nash equilibrium.11
Given this, we read off the symmetric Nash equilibrium
under a particular payment rule as the peak of a plot such as
that in Figure 5, which plots the gain in utility for strategy
O % vs. 0% in a system in which every agent follows strat-
egy
O %, in this case for the 5 buyers/5 sellers problem set.
In this case, notice that the equilibrium manipulation level
in Large and Threshold is less than under the other rules,
in this case around 10% and 20% in Large and Threshold,
compared with 30%, 40% and 50% in Fractional, Equal and
No-Discount. Inaddition, theamount ofutilitygain inLarge
and Threshold is much less than in the other schemes.
InTable 4wesummarize theresultsof experiments across
all problem sets. We compare: the average utility gain, and
the correlation with Vickrey discounts, at manipulation lev-
els of 10%, 20% and 30% in each scheme; and the average
optimal degree of manipulation by agents in each scheme,
11One beneﬁt of this technique is that we have a method to mea-
sure the degree of manipulation even when there is in fact no sym-
metric pure Nash equilibrium.
7No-Discount Vickrey Small Frac
Utility
P Gain 0.799 -0.195 0.479 0.211
Correlation 0.053 1.0 0.356 0.590
Manipulation,
￿
ß 48 0 48 32
Efﬁciency (%) 58 100 58 78
Threshold Equal Large Reverse
Utility Gain 0.110 0.516 0.029 0.337
Correlation 0.543 0.356 0.176 0.522
Manipulation,
￿
ß 22 46 18 44
Efﬁciency (%) 86 62 88 64
Table 4: Experimental results. Utility gain and Correlation with
Vickrey discounts computed for manip. 10%, 20% and 30%, and
averaged over all problem instances (for 5–20 agents).
and the corresponding allocative efﬁciency. The allocative
efﬁciency in the Large and Threshold schemes is consider-
ably higher than in the other schemes.
Discussion
Thepartial ordering
%
Large,Threshold
,
R
Q
Fractional
Q
Re-
verse
Q
%
Equal, Small
,
from the experimental results is re-
markably consistent with the results of our theoretical anal-
ysis. Although the Large scheme generates slightly less ma-
nipulation and higher allocative efﬁciency than Threshold,
the correlation between discounts and Vickrey discounts is
much greater in Threshold than Large. An agent’s discount
in Large is very sensitive to its bid, and we expect Large
to be less robust than Threshold in practice because of this
all-or-nothing characteristic.
As discussed earlier, we have made a number of assump-
tions, both in the analytic models of agent manipulation
and also in the manipulation structure considered experi-
mentally. In addition to understanding the effects of these
assumptions, in future work we would also like to: quan-
tify worst-case and average-case utility gains from manipu-
lation in each payment scheme, given a particular amount of
surplus; and derive optimal payment schemes, for example
minimizing worst-case gains from manipulation. One av-
enueistoaskhowbadwouldtheefﬁciencygetifeveryagent
was perfectly informed about the other agents, and followed
a best-possible bidding strategy given the payment rules. Fi-
nally, we suspect that stochastic payment rules might prove
to have interesting incentive properties.
Conclusions
We constructed budget-balanced payment schemes to min-
imize different distance functions to Vickrey payments,
and showed analytically and experimentally that a simple
Thresholdrulehasbetterincentivepropertiesthanotherpay-
ment schemes. The effect of the payment scheme is to im-
plement a distribution of manipulation-preventingdiscounts
across a population of agents to exploit an agent’s inherent
uncertainty about bids from other agents and the degree to
which manipulation can be useful. The Threshold rule in-
creases the amount by which an agent with a large degree
of manipulation freedom must adjust its bid to have a useful
effect on the price it ﬁnally pays, while leaving unaffected
the manipulation properties for agents with a small degree
of manipulation freedom.
Finally, we note that the schemes outlined here can also
allow a market maker to make a small proﬁt by taking a
sliver of budget-balance, or used in combination with a par-
ticipation charge to move payments closer to Vickrey pay-
ments.
Acknowledgments
We thank William Walsh, and the anonymous reviewers, for
their helpful comments and suggestions. This research was
funded in part by National Science Foundation Grant SBR
97-08965. The ﬁrst author gratefully acknowledges ﬁnan-
cial support from an IBM Research Fellowship.
References
Barbera, S., and Jackson, M. O. 1995. Strategy-proof ex-
change. Econometrica 63(1):51–87.
Clarke, E. H. 1971. Multipart pricing of public goods.
Public Choice 11:17–33.
de Vries, S., and Vohra, R. 2000. Combinatorial auc-
tions: A brief survey. Tech. report, MEDS Department,
Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern
University.
Groves, T. 1973. Incentives in teams. Econometrica
41:617–631.
Kalagnanam, J. R.; Davenport, A. J.; and Lee, H. S. 2000.
Computational aspects of clearing continous double auc-
tions with assignment constraints and indivisible demand.
IBM Research Report RC 21660 (97613). To appear in
Electronic Commerce Research Journal.
McAfee, R. P. 1992. A dominant strategy double auction.
J. of Economic Theory 56:434–450.
Myerson, R. B., and Satterthwaite, M. A. 1983. Efﬁcient
mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of Economic
Theory 28:265–281.
Rothkopf, M. H.; Pekeˇ c, A.; and Harstad, R. M.
1998. Computationally manageable combinatorial auc-
tions. Management Science 44(8):1131–1147.
Sandholm, T. 1999. An algorithm for optimal winner de-
termination in combinatorial auctions. In Proc. 16th Inter-
national Joint Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence(IJCAI-
99), 542–547.
Varian, H., and MacKie-Mason, J. K. 1995. Generalized
Vickrey auctions. Tech. report, University of Michigan.
Vickrey, W. 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions, and com-
petitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance 16:8–37.
Walsh, W.; Wellman, M.; and Ygge, F. 2000. Combina-
torial auctions for supply chain formation. In Proc. ACM
Conference on Electronic Commerce, 260–269.
Wurman, P. R.; Walsh, W. E.; and Wellman, M. P. 1998.
Flexible double auctions for electronic commerce: Theory
and implementation. Decision Support Systems 24:17–27.
8